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Introduction.

In his later years, the democratic theorist, Sheldon Wolin, published the second
edition of a project he had completed over forty years prior, his magnum opus, Politics and
Vision. As Wolin readily admits, he felt compelled to revisit his book, because political
developments since its original publication had “rendered obsolete the terms that were
invoked in the conclusion of Part One.”1 This second edition chronicles the transformation
of the United States, through the Cold War, from a conventional, though powerful nation
state into a postmodern Superpower. In the manner of certain regimes from the twentieth
century, this mutant power tends toward totality, but does so in seemingly the reverse
manner. Whereas the Third Reich or Stalinist Russia were characterized not only by harsh
repression but the mobilization of their citizens, Superpower rules through engendered
apathy and self-interest born from a general feeling of instability endemic to capitalism:
“[Superpower] might drown out or marginalize opposition rather than hunt it down,
pacify public space by fostering communications monopolies rather than by
unleashing storm troopers. Its leaders might dominate society, not to fulfill a mythic
mission, but simply to make money and control power. It might project power
beyond its borders, not in order to occupy foreign lands but to gain access to new
markets and resources. Such a regime might discriminate, even repress, but not
persecute.”2
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Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, 2016 ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 605.
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The impetus for Superpower to resort to this kind of repression, which Wolin terms
“inverted totalitarianism,” is in order to maintain a passive, yet tacitly consenting public,
while expanding its empire around the globe. It is neoliberal in the sense that citizens hold
rights, but are discouraged from participating in any meaningful democratic activity.
Rather, rule under Superpower is delegated to technocrats in conjunction with the owners
of capital.
Wolin’s portrait of inverted totalitarianism, modern hopelessness, apathy, and the
degradation of democracy are so eloquently executed, they make his subsequent
prescriptive solutions appear inadequate in comparison. He ultimately advocates for a kind
of democratic localism in which everyday people are able to experience and participate in
the processes of collective power. This sentiment in itself is inoffensive, even beautiful,
however, he tacks onto it the lofty pretense that creating such democracy on its own has
the potential to subvert the oppressive structures of Superpower. Furthermore, he rejects
theories of organization, in favor of an idealized vision of democracy as an organic
experience, without clear power to support it. In What Revolutionary Action Means Today,
he better articulates this rejectionist philosophy with a fervently anti-institutional
argument.3 He writes, “Instead of imitating most other political theories and adopting the
state as the primary structure and then adapting the activity of the citizen to the state,
democratic thinking should renounce the state paradigm and, along with it, the liberal legal
corruption of the citizen.”4
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Wolin’s reluctance to engage with state, or any other institutional form for that
matter, poses a number practical issues for his vision. He hopes that democracy on a local
level will provide enough continuity to people’s lives to counteract the disruptive influence
of late capitalism, however neglects to address how this return to the localism will come
about, nor how it will sustain itself. This is, in part, due to his conviction that democracy
cannot be sustained. To him, democracy is “ephemeral” and “amorphous,” unable to be
tamed or systematized. As a result, his solution lies not in the reshaping of institutions, but
in a psychological transformation of society. This philosophy in many ways mirrors what
the author Jodi Dean terms “new left realism,” the intellectual movement which rejected
the state and party as organizational forms in reaction to the Soviet Union. She writes of the
new left realists, “They reject revolution, prioritizing democracy in citizenship. In effect,
they fear politics...”5 The parallels with Wolin are clear; he is indeed expressly against
revolution, and does continuously reiterate his despair at the relegation of the citizen to the
“occasional voter.”
However, Wolin does demonstrate a degree self-awareness further on in the above
mentioned article:
“While it is of the utmost importance that democrats support and encourage
political activity at the grassroots level, it is equally necessary that the political
limitations of such activity be recognized. It is politically incomplete...There are
major problems in our society that are general in nature and necessitate modes of
vision and action that are comprehensive rather than parochial.”6

5
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Though it conspicuously does not appear in Politics, “politically incomplete” is a vital
phrase. As much as grassroots, non-institutional movements are important and appealing,
there are “real problems” which need to be countered on their own terms and at an
appropriate scale.
So what does a politically complete movement look like? Drawing on the work of
two prominent historical organizers, V.I. Lenin and Saul Alinsky, this project intends to
address the issue of Wolin’s incompleteness through political realist mindset, as well as
delve into the question of whether democracy and organization can ever be reconciled.
Political realism for the left is a critical tool, which has been underutilized over the past few
decades. Peering through its lense, we are able to see the deficiencies of works like Wolin’s,
and go about addressing them practically. Hopefully this tool can be expanded to apply to
the modern Left’s struggles.

Literature Review.

Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics:
The realism Raymond Geuss outlines in Philosophy and Real Politics serves as a
helpful complement to Wolin’s mostly conjectural style. Both are similarly fed up with the
state of liberal academia, and level parallel critiques against the legitimizing nature of its
philosophy to a corrupt status quo. Unlike Wolin, however, Geuss’s aim is not to provide a
comprehensive theory or in-depth cultural analysis, but rather to sketch out the basis of a
political realist framework. Geuss does not have a political agenda, nor does he explicitly

4

express his political views other than in occasional comments about neoliberal depravity.
Despite being a self-described neo-Leninist, he makes a point to say that this label does not
as much represent his personal views or values, as it does his frame of mind. He sets the
stage for the kind of political realism this project will focus on, while not acting upon it
himself.
Geuss describes political realism as the inverse of the kind of idealism that has
become commonplace in political philosophy. In contrast to politics as “applied ethics,”
Geuss’s realism is designed around the perception that morality, in the ideal sense, does
not drive action, and therefore is not a suitable as a means of analysis. Rather, it is more
productive to consider “real motivations” when discussing politics, hence “realism.”
Realism is an attempt to view the world through the fewest ideological lenses possible in
order to accomplish a specific goal. The more effectively one can extricate oneself from
ideology, the higher likelihood one’s decisions will not be mired in unjustified assumptions,
and therefore the more informed one’s decisions can be. This means not starting with an
ideal (e.g.: Rawls's conception of justice), and attempting to force it into being, but rather
examining what is possible to achieve within the limits of circumstance, “Thus politics is
not about doing what is good or rational or beneficial simpliciter...but about the pursuit of
what is good in a particular concrete case by agents with limited powers and resources,
where choice of one thing to pursue means failure to choose and pursue another.”7 Geuss
warns of the dangers of projecting one’s own beliefs onto others and expecting them to act
accordingly, which he sees as a common error among idealists. To him, realism is “not
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[concerned] with how people ought ideally (or ought ‘rationally’) to act, what they ought to
desire, or value, the kind of people they ought to be, etc., but, rather, with the way the
social, economic, political, etc., institutions actually operate in some society at some given
time, and what really does move human beings to act in given circumstances”8. With this,
Geuss does away with traditional notions about human nature (e.g: humans are inherently
good, bad, rational, self-interested, etc.), to say instead that humans are above all
inconsistent.
Another point Geuss emphasizes is the connection between power and politics,
going so far as to claim that power is the first principle of politics. Again this critique is
directed at idealist philosophers, namely John Rawls,9 who avoid the subject of power
altogether—to broach it would mean to acknowledge a deep inequality in liberal society.
He expands upon traditional views of power (e.g.: Max Weber’s conception of the state as
the holder of a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence10), cautioning that viewing
power as purely coercive discounts its other forms (e.g.: persuasive, perceived, collective).
Power, he argues, should be treated not as a homogeneous substance that functions
identically in each situation, but as irregular, particular, and coming from various sources.
Power and ideology, for instance, are complexly intertwined; dangerously, hegemonic
powers preserve themselves through the manipulation of ideology to make them appear,
“...as if they were universal, necessary, invariant, or natural features of all forms of human
social life, or as if they arose spontaneously and uncoercedly by free human action.”11 As with

Geuss, Philosophy and Real, 9.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
10
Geuss, Philosophy and Real, 34.
11
Geuss, Philosophy and Real, 52.
8
9

6

his descriptions of human behavior, power for Geuss is nebulous, and has few
universalities. Though this may appear to be an unhelpful conclusion at first glance, Geuss
maintains that it is in fact integral to political realism. Lenin understood power’s variance
when he conceived of the analytical question, “Who whom?” which Geuss expands to “Who
does/could do what to whom for whose benefit?”12 It’s a question designed to address the
loci of power in a given situation—who has it or is perceived to have it, who is subject to it,
and who benefits from that subjugation. As Geuss demonstrates in this thought experiment,
questions of power are certainly complicated, but any attempt to view society without
them is incomplete.
Finally, Geuss echoes, or rather takes directly, the Leninist principle, “Politics is a
craft or skill, and ought precisely not to be analysed...as the mastery of a set of principles or
theories.”13 This sentiment is expressed by other political organizers, such as Saul Alinsky;
it is a truth that any political realist must come to terms with, i.e., politics is not a science,
despite it being touted as one. Politics is contextual, Geuss says, it has no eternal questions,
and therefore no eternal truths. Instead one can only inherit a method of interpreting one’s
circumstances, a means through which to pinpoint baseless ideological assumptions, and
make the better judgements as a result.
Geuss establishes for this project the structure of political realism in possibly its
most basic, academic form. Although this could be construed as contradictory to his central
criticism, this is precisely where his value lies. Whereas Lenin and Alinsky were steeped in
the conflicts of their times, Geuss has synthesized their logic as an observer and in no
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uncertain terms. Lenin, for instance, was writing to the Party, to the proletariat, and
ultimately to the cause. He is an example of realism in action, and is therefore useful to
observe, but it is also less clear what should be taken away from him. Geuss has extracted
that message, and brought it to the modern day, inspiring a revival of political realism on
the Left.1415 His realism can help us analyze our own problems and devise suitable
solutions. He affirms an intuition clearly felt by many others, that liberal idealist politics
have failed in the face of their opposition, that history has not ended, and therefore must be
approached as it is, rather than as it ought to be.

Jodi Dean, Crowds and Party:

Jodi Dean’s book, Crowds and Party, contributes to this project in a number of ways.
First, she affirms the need for direct action in politics, particularly in electoral politics—a
topic which no other source addresses. Second, she provides in interesting contemporary
anthropological analysis, which will be used to complement Wolin’s.
The central thesis of Dean’s is that the creation of a communist party would not only
consolidate left power into a formidable force, but also provide a space under capitalism
within to view the world from a non-capitalist perspective. Obviously Dean’s book is a
work of political theory, and accordingly does not lay out how exactly her vision of the
Party would be organized other than that it would operate at “multiple levels.” If I one

William Galston, "Realism in Political Theory," European Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 4 (October
22, 2010): https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885110374001.
15
Vijay Phulwani, "The Poor Man’s Machiavelli: Saul Alinsky and the Morality of Power," American
Political Science Review 110, no. 4 (November 16, 2016): https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000459.
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weakness with Crowds and Party had to be selected, it would be this, “The problem the Left
encounters today is less a matter of organizational details than it is of solidary political
will.”16 Dean is right to point to the disunity of the Left as a major problem for any effective
political action, but her phrasing raises a paradox: which came first solidarity or the Party?
As any political realist would say (even Wolin mentions it), and as Dean recounts many
times, revolutions do not come about spontaneously, rather they are built. Without the
proper organization, movements, protests, and social critiques will all be forgotten as time
moves on. It takes the organizing force of the Party to overcome the transience of any
individual movement in order to turn them into a consistent communist politic. As much as
the Left is in need of solidarity in this moment, its answer lies first and foremost in the
Party, as the Party is the means of building solidarity. Lenin knew this, which is precisely
why he proposed the Party as a vanguard, and as Dean puts it herself, “Such a
concentration would let people who want to be engaged in radical politics but aren’t sure
what to do have a place to go, a place to start.”17

16
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Chapter 1: Lenin.

Vladimir Lenin, inarguably one of the most significant political figures of the
twentieth century, played a leading role in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. He was a
prolific writer, as well as a gifted politician and organizer. Due to his monumental legacy,
the Marxism-Leninism branch of thought was formed, which incorporated the many
innovations to traditional Marxism which Lenin both theorized and put into practice. His
unrelentingly practical take on Marxist materialism, his grasp of the art of politics, and his
strategy of vanguarism, together form a particular incarnation of political realism which
still has much to offer the Left today in its political struggles.

Lenin’s Marxist Materialism:

Lenin certainly ranks among the greatest Marxist scholars. Indeed he dedicates
many pages toward (re)affirming his faith in the science of dialectical materialism, and
condemning those who he believes pervert its teachings. Nevertheless, while Lenin rarely
expressly criticized Marx, whether through the distorting effects of subjective
interpretation or as an intentionally subtle critique, the Marxism Lenin portrays is uniquely
his own. His two most famous deviations from the original Marxist doctrine were, first, his
ambition to skip over the capitalist phase of development in Russia in favor of a leap
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directly to communism—in contrast to the more measured march of history Marx
proposes; and second, in the addition of the vanguard party as a revolutionary vehicle.
These are, no doubt, significant modifications to Marxism, likely ones Marx himself would
have contested, and thus could be considered adequate grounds on their own to constitute
the inauguration of the Marxist-Leninist branch of thought. However, to do so based solely
on their existence would miss precisely why Lenin developed them in the first place, that
both are, in fact, conclusions reached through Lenin’s particularly pragmatic approach to
revolution.
For Lenin, materialism is not merely a theory to be dispassionately pondered, but an
invaluable tactical tool, replacing the “chaos and arbitrariness” of previous philosophy with
a “strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory.”18 What it presents is a world
grounded in systems for the distribution of resources, systems divided into classes
possessing distinct class identities, identities harboring their own interests, both conflicting
and aligning depending on the fluctuation of material conditions. The bourgeoisie, the
tsarists, the proletariat, the peasants, the semi-proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and so on,
can all be characterized by their relationships to private property, to production, to the
state, and to each other. Class for Lenin is a means of breaking down the confounding
complexity of society into component parts capable of being analyzed, more or less
accurately, as discrete actors. Doing so allows him to define his enemies as well as allies in
convenient terms. He can then speculate on their fears, desires, and guiding ideologies, in
order to better predict their movements. Understanding these relationships can in turn,

V.I. Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism," 1913, in Lenin: Selected
Works (New York, Ny: International Publishers, 1971), 21.
18
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Lenin professes, inform the astute revolutionary of the correct path to take given the forces
at play.
An excellent example of this method of evaluation comes from Lenin’s Letters from
Afar written in March of 1917.19 In this series, Lenin issues an analysis of the
contemporaneous February Revolution20 from his position of exile. Over a period of only
eight days, Lenin could but read accounts in Swiss newspapers of the Russian
revolutionaries’ defeat of the historic Romanov Dynasty, and their establishment of a
system of dual rule in its place, divided between the bourgeois Provisional Government and
the proletarian Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. To explain the speed and ease with which the
revolution was carried out, Lenin determined that it the result as an unlikely alignment
interests between inconsonant classes, “an extremely unique historical situation, absolutely
dissimilar currents, absolutely heterogeneous class interests, absolutely contrary political
and social strivings have merged, and in a strikingly ‘harmonious’ manner.”21 What Lenin is
referring to is the brief alliance formed between the bourgeoisie (landlords,
Octobrist-Cadets, and petty bourgeois included), and the proletariat (including the poor
peasantry) for the purposes of finally deposing the Romanovs.
While both the bourgeoisie and proletariat were invested in the death of tsarism,
they held conflicting visions of what would follow suit. For the proletariat, revolution
meant the end of a brutal and archaic regime, and an opening for the possibility of a more
equitable society. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, was not as much concerned with

Written during his period of exile in Switzerland, the Letters from Afar came only six months before the
October Revolution.
20
Also known as the March Revolution.
21
V.I. Lenin, The April Theses or The Tasks of of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution and Letters
from Afar, trans. Bernard Isaacs (Brooklyn, NY, 2016), 27.
19
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social progress in Russia, as it was in the perpetuation of the “imperialist war,” WWI, and
its promise of colonial spoils.22 Further incentive for bourgeois revolt came from the
influence of Anglo-French capital—it too invested in the continuation of war—which
financially supported the Russian bourgeoisie in its quest for political power, “...the
Anglo-French imperialists and the Guchkovs and the Milyukovs23 aimed at deposing the
‘chief warrior’, Nicholas Romanov, and putting more energetic, fresh and more capable
warriors in his place.”24 Thus both the bourgeoisie and proletariat found each other
miraculously on the same side, if only for a short time, and with their combined
forces—noting that the masses had remained mobilized in the wake of the first Russian
Revolution ending in 1907—they faced little difficulty in overthrowing the tsars.
This portrait Lenin paints of Russia’s tumultuous environment in 1917, particularly
the interplay of classes and their situation within a greater global crisis, is clearly
materialist in its origin. What Lenin wishes his fellow revolutionaries to understand is that
this conflict is not one of abstract ideas but of concrete interests. In this moment of
upheaval, the bourgeoisie and proletariat found a mutual use in one another, and thus were
able to make peace for a time, however, Lenin warns, it would mistake to believe that this
peace can last. By nature of their relationship to property and production, the bourgeoisie
and proletariat are fundamentally enemies. An opposition to tsarism cannot overshadow
the fact that the bourgeoisie, being capitalists, benefit from imperialist war, whereas the
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proletariat face ruin because of it—these are irreconcilable differences. Consequently, to
appeal to the bourgeoisie on a moral or intellectual level to cooperate in the long term (i.e.,
to ask for peace) would be either the naïve gesture of an idealist misinformed on the
principles of materialism, or a deliberate betrayal of the revolutionary cause. Lenin writes:
“Such, and only such, is the way the situation developed. Such, and only such, in the
view that can be taken by a politician who does not fear the truth, who soberly
weighs the balance of social forces in the revolution, who appraises every ‘current
situation’ not only from the standpoint of all its present, current peculiarities, but
also from the standpoint of the more fundamental motivations, the deeper
interest-relationship of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, both in Russia and
throughout the world.”25
It speaks to his mindset that Lenin so often invokes sobriety as the mark of a prudent
revolutionary, as the term itself could easily be substituted for ‘realism.’ One way to
interpret its reoccurence is as a call to leave revolutionary passion (and sentimentality)
behind when evaluating one’s circumstances. This means not only seeing through “sugary
diplomatic and ministerial lies” of the bourgeoisie, but also being able to get past one’s own
fantastical projections, in order to arrive at the material reality of a situation. Being well
situated in reality provides a stable basis for subsequent action, “...we must first endeavour
to define with the greatest possible objective precision, in order that Marxist tactics may be
based upon the only possible solid foundation—the foundation of facts.”26 Though Lenin

V.I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism," 1908, in Lenin: Selected Works (New York, NY: International
Publishers, 1971), 29.
26
V.I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism," 1908, in Lenin: Selected Works (New York, NY: International
Publishers, 1971), 32.
25
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admits to the limitations of theory, Marxist materialism, for many of his purposes, provides
a mostly factual account of social reality, and thereby an adequate foundation upon which
to build tactics.
In order to further explore the topic of sobriety for Lenin, it is useful to understand
how he conceives of the idealist/materialist divide. Raymond Geuss, a self-described
neo-leninist, characterizes idealism as philosophy based on abstract principles (e.g.:
right/wrong, rational/irrational) deemed innately true, and therefore retaining of their
moral authority regardless of context. The common postmodernist critique of idealism,
originating famously with Nietzsche, takes issue with the very notion of “truth,” however
this is by no means Lenin’s perspective. While he disagrees with much of the substance of
idealist philosophy, Lenin explicitly confirms that he holds certain principles to be true,
namely those of Marxism, though he maintains that it is not a frozen doctrine.27 More
interesting, and informative to the nature of his own thinking, is the issue he takes with
idealism’s applicability to the real world, where morals rarely take precedence. He writes
in 1919, two years after the October Revolution:
“General talk about freedom, equality and democracy is in fact a blind repetition of
concepts shaped by the relations of commodity production. To attempt to solve the
concrete problems of the dictatorship of the proletariat by such generalities is
tantamount to accepting the theories and principles of the bourgeoisie in their
entirety. From the point of view of the proletariat, the question can be put only in
the following way: freedom from oppression by which class? equality of which class

27

“Marxism is omnipotent, because it is true.”
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with which? democracy based on private property, or on a struggle for the abolition of
private property?—and so forth.”28 [italics added]
As demonstrated in this excerpt, it is not that Lenin necessarily opposes the ideals of
freedom, equality, and democracy—these ideals in fact drive much of his revolutionary
ardor—however he is critical of their nebulousness when proffered with neither a clear
goal nor a pragmatic means of attaining it. The ideal of “freedom,” for instance, is
practically meaningless when untethered from any earthly form—to paraphrase the above
quote, freedom from what? Though ideals may aspire to change, they are fundamentally
unachievable, and to be concerned with such abstractions is bourgeois. Lenin implores his
more idealistic comrades to consider soberly how to bring their convictions into being; that
is, to ask specific questions, develop specific goals, and generally take a materialist
approach to politics, which examines progress not by its relationship to metaphysical
concepts but to an observable reality.

Lenin’s Art of Politics:

What does Lenin mean when he writes, in a letter from September 1917, “it is
impossible to remain loyal to Marxism, to remain loyal to the revolution unless insurrection
is treated as an art”? This sentiment, that insurrection (and politics) must be dealt with
artfully surfaces repeatedly through Lenin’s work, accompanied each time with new

V.I. Lenin, "Economics and Politics in Era of Dictatorship of Proletariat," 1919, in Lenin: Selected Works
(New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971), 505.
28
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additions to its ever-expanding character.29 What becomes clear is that, in characteristic
fashion, Lenin has again appropriated an old Marxist idea to expand upon via pragmatism.
As both politics and art are messy affairs, so too is the art of politics; in the most concise
terms, the art of politics can be described as the practice of skillfully managing the
innumerable variables involved in a politics struggle through careful analysis, organization,
and action.
To begin with, a point Lenin stresses over and over is that a movement must possess
a tangible goal, or else risk falling into the trap of idealism or, worse still, be left floundering
with no clear direction. A definite goal orients a movement, acting as a lighthouse in the fog
of class struggle. Not only does a goal provide a measure of progress, it mitigates the
insecurity inspired by uncertainty, as well as combats idealist moralism by explicitly
defining what concern (the revolution) reigns supreme. On a purely practical level, a
definite goal provides an ends around which to craft a strategy. Much of Lenin’s actions are
explained once one realizes that his ultimate goal is not to overthrow of the bourgeoisie,
but to establish lasting socialism, “We must prove worth executors of this most difficult
(and most gratifying) task of the socialist revolution. We must fully realise that in order to
administer successfully, besides being able to convince people, besides being able to win a
civil war, we must be able to do practical organizational work.”30 Though he admits that the
violence of class insurrection is exhilarating, and indeed a necessity in the course of events,
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In this particular letter, he refers to four aspects of the art of insurrection: 1) the power of stringing
successes along as a form of momentum for a movement; 2) the necessity to rely on the “advanced
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taking advantage of enemy vacillations as a time to strike.
30
V.I. Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," 1918, in Lenin: Selected Works (New
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he views it as only one step on a longer path. Lenin urges his fellow revolutionaries to
consider what will happen after the revolution, so that they may conceive of a way to
differentiate themselves from countless failed revolts, and thus consummate something
genuinely new, “Undoubtedly, the revolution will teach us, and will teach the masses of the
people. But the question that now confronts a militant political party is: shall we be able to
teach the revolution anything?”31
The difference between “tactics” and “strategy” is frequently muddled, and it
appears that Lenin too often neglects to linguistically distinguish between them—though
this may be the product of mistranslation. The fact of the matter is that there is an
important distinction to be made; whereas strategy describes the approach/design of an
entire movement, tactics apply to specific objectives as they arise. Despite his potential
overuse of the term tactics, it is not difficult to see these two sides emerge in his discourse
across different texts. What is indisputable is that Lenin believes wholeheartedly in the
import of maintaining a consistent strategy through the duration of a movement, which he
grounds in a well-organized, core revolutionary party (referred to by many aliases, most
famously the vanguard). In a sense, the vanguard reflects Lenin’s conviction in strategic
consistency, as it is intended to act as a revolutionary anchor under ever-fluctuating
circumstances. As conditions change, so do tactics, that is unavoidable; in order to combat
the movement from fraying, the vanguard remains an assured constant—competent,
disciplined, well-organized, and ever-ready. He describes, “a strong and centralised
organisation of revolutionaries capable of leading the preparatory struggle, every

V.I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," 1905, in Lenin: Selected
Works (New York, NY: International Publishers, n.d.), 51.
31
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unexpected outbreak, and, finally, the decisive assault.”32 In an article titled Where to
Begin?, published in 1901, Lenin responds to a group of overzealous revolutionaries
propagating the sentiment “If the circumstances change within twenty-four hours, then the
tactics must be changed within twenty-four hours.” He writes:
“‘Change the tactics within twenty-four hours!’ But in order to change tactics it is
first necessary to have tactics; without a strong organisation skilled in waging
political struggle under all circumstances and at all times, there can be no question
of that systematic plan of action, illumined by firm principles and steadfastly carried
out, which alone is worth of the name tactics.”33 (38)
Strategy follows tactics; it is logical stance, particularly when the strategy, the party, is the
architect of tactics. The implications of the vanguard serving such a central, directorial role
in revolution will be explored further later, but its practical and strategic role should be
obvious for the time being.
On a specific tactical level, it becomes somewhat harder to generalize Lenin’s theory
due to their being, by nature, contingent to their circumstances. However what does
remain consistent throughout his writings is a rough formula for tactical analysis. For
instance, Lenin continuously uses terms like “general conditions,” “special conditions,”
“concrete peculiarities,” and “the political situation.” Though these phrases hold slightly
different meanings, all concern the unique factors which inform the tactics of a given
political situation. Further on in the article referenced above, Lenin makes a specific tactical
argument for why the party should hold off on revolution, despite the massive peasant
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uprisings going on at the time, “...anyone who is capable of appreciating the general
conditions of our struggle and who is mindful of them at every ‘turn’ in the historical course
of events that at the present moment our slogan cannot be ‘To the assault’, but has to be,
‘Lay siege to the enemy fortress’.”34 While some saw the passion of the peasants as a signal
to surge forward, Lenin insisted that the Social Democrats’ core revolutionary force was in
fact neither large enough nor competent enough to channel this power toward meaningful
ends, “The mass (spontaneous) movement lacks ‘ideologists’35 sufficiently trained
theoretically to be proof against all vacillations; it lacks leaders with such a broad political
outlook...such organisational talent as to create a militant political party on the basis of the
new movement.”36 He argues that rather than seeking full-on revolution straightaway, the
Social Democrats should instead focus their energy on improving their own organization,
and taking such pre-insurrectionary measures as printing a party newspaper and
producing a wide-scale propaganda campaign. By his calculations, the conditions in 1901
were not right; the vanguard was not ready to lead an insurrection, the masses not
sufficiently politically conscious; all these factors indicated to Lenin that the party should
bide its time, lest it risk the fall out of a premature altercation. As per his prediction, only
four years later the first Russian revolution came.
This display of restraint transitions into a major theme of Lenin’s tactical approach:
timing. Lenin stresses often how different times call for different measures, and that the
intelligent political actor must be able to distinguish between them. There are times for

 Lenin, "Where to Begin?," in Lenin: Selected, 39.
“Ideologists” is a reference to an earlier conversation which juxtaposed the “spontaneous” masses to
the “ideological” or “conscious” revolutionaries, i.e., the Social-Democratic Party.
36
V.I. Lenin, The April Theses or The Tasks of of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution and Letters
from Afar, trans. Bernard Isaacs (Brooklyn, NY, 2016), 47.
34
35

20

action and times for active growth, times for compromise and times when no compromise
must be accepted. Most important of all is knowing the exact moment when to strike—a
subtle but crucial point. Lenin writes:
“The art of politics (and the Communist’s correct understanding of his tasks)
consists in correctly gauging the conditions and the moment when the vanguard of
the proletariat can successfully assume power, when it is able—during and after the
seizure of power—to win adequate support from sufficiently broad strata of the
working class and of the non-proletarian working masses, and when it is able
thereafter to maintain, consolidate and extend its rule by educating, training and
attracting ever broader masses of the working people.”37
The way he describes it here, this “moment” fits securely within a greater sequence of
events only if it is engaged at the correct time; striking too early might mean a movement is
never able to gain momentum, too late and the public may have lost interest. Overcoming
the opponent means little if power cannot be maintained. Afterall, what would the point of
all this violence be if the opponent were to promptly regain power? We have observed this
sentiment at multiple points in Lenin’s writing already. He repeatedly implores his
comrades to be patient, despite the presence of revolutionary passion in the air. Lenin
considers not only the moment of insurrection but the revolution in its entirety, include
both its build up and consolidation, “The socialist revolution is not a single act, it is not one
battle on one front, but a whole epoch of acute class conflicts, a long series of battles on all
fronts, i.e., on all questions of economics and politics, battles that can only end in the
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expropriation of the bourgeoisie.”38 This demonstrates not only his commitment to
socialism, but his keen awareness that success is not guaranteed. Though a movement may
have potential, its period of ripeness is fleeting.
On the topic of compromises, Lenin displays his nuanced position as a political actor
in responding to party doctrinaires—mostly inexperienced revolutionaries who refused to
give ground—that compromise itself does not betray the revolution—that is determined by
the conditions under which the compromise is made. By Lenin’s estimation, there are
roughly two types of compromises:
“...a compromise enforced by objective conditions (such as a lack of strike funds, no
outside support, starvation and exhaustion)—a compromise which in no way
minimises the revolutionary devotion and readiness to carry on the struggle on the
part of the workers who have agreed to such a compromise—and, on the other
hand, a compromise by traitors who try to ascribe to objective causes their
self-interest..., their cowardice, desire to toady to the capitalists, and readiness to
yield to intimidation, sometimes to persuasion, sometimes to sops, and sometimes
to flattery from capitalists.”39
In those moments of exhaustion and isolation, the savvy political actor does not obstinately
stick by their ideals, but rather tactically negotiates a compromise with their opponents as
a means forward. The implication is that though the idealist revolutionary may believe they
are being principled in their refusal to compromise, their naïve actions are in fact hurting
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the greater movement. The more principled option is in fact to deal with the enemy
agreeably, so that the revolution may live another day.
We encounter a much less agreeable Lenin in his writings on the dictatorship of the
proletariat. As opposed to the moments of desperation mentioned above, the period after
the revolution in which the dictatorship of the proletariat is formed is no time to
compromise, but rather is a time to act “dictatorially.” The dictatorship, according to Lenin,
must smash the remnants of the bourgeois state apparatus, so as to deny them the chance
for recourse, and thus “complete” the revolution. One can witness in this instance Lenin’s
harsh realism. In times of weakness, when the power does not rest in the hands of the
people, compromise is acceptable, that is, as long as it is comes under sufficient duress.
This dynamic is reversed in times of strength. Once the dictatorship of the proletariat exists
making compromises with reactionaries serves no purpose; the power is with the
dictatorship, and actions must be made to retain it, therefore the reactionaries must be
expelled. It is a calculation built upon a commitment to the ultimate aim, socialism, above
all else. While this could be seen as a hypocritical reversal of stances, to Lenin, the
unabashed realist, such an accusation means very little, “...in nature and in society all
distinctions are fluid and up to a certain point conventional.”40 This is an example of Lenin’s
political relativism.
The moment of insurrection, the time for action, portrays possibly Lenin’s most
compelling side, and represents the completion of his political realism. As much as Lenin
talks incessantly about the need to plan, to evaluate, to be cautious, he readily admits that,
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in the frenzied moment of insurrection, these considerations are of little use. For one, the
urgent demands of the moment make such a meticulous approach impossible, because
there simply is not time to stop and think. However, more damning to the planning method
is the fact that whatever conclusions may be reached about current conditions, and the
appropriate tactical responses, will be just as soon become outdated, either due to the
rapidly evolving nature of the situation, or due to the fact that putting theory into practice
naturally changes the objective conditions themselves, causing those original calculations
to lose their objective basis. Poignantly Lenin admits that there are indeed innate
limitations to knowledge, but he does not lament this fact. Rather Lenin concludes, in his
typical pragmatic manner, that this lack of knowledge should be taken in stride. One will
never be omniscient, therefore to procrastinate in action, because of a perceived dearth of
information, particularly in an urgent moment, is a weak excuse. At some point, one is
forced to act, regardless of how uncomfortable they might feel doing so. For the
revolutionary, to be afraid of acting is to negate oneself, and, ““If the situation were not
exceptionally complicated there would be no revolution. If you are afraid of wolves don’t go
into the forest.”41 Theory is only a guide to action, Lenin says.
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Chapter 2: Alinsky.

Saul Alinsky was part of a distinguished line of organizers America produced in the
twentieth century. He was, by trade, a community organizer based in Chicago, who spent
much of his time traveling around the US, organizing whichever communities were
required his help. Among his accomplishments, he successfully brought together Chicago’s
Back of the Yards neighborhood, a meat-packing district notorious for its heinous living
conditions, creating a neighborhood council which survives to this day. In general he
sought to empower communities through the creation of democratic organizations capable
of addressing residents’ issues via direct action. Pertinent to our purposes, Alinsky
described himself as “political realist,” an attitude which came to define his approach to
community organizing. Alinsky employed political realism in a radically democratic way,
repurposing concepts normally associated with social strife (e.g.: self-interest and power
politics), which are generally regarded with distaste by the liberal tradition, toward
democratic ends. His particular brand of political realism, similar but distinct from Lenin’s,
teaches us that realism is not the exclusive domain of revolutionaries, but rather is a shared
mindset among some of the most effective organizers in history. It is through the contrasts
between Lenin and Alinsky that we are able to uncover the generalizable principles of
realism, clarifying what it has to offer mass movements today.
The very first parallel between Lenin and Alinsky, arguably the first divergence as
well, is their prolific use of a class terminology in a tactical context. Whereas Lenin employs
traditional Marxist language, i.e.: bourgeoisie, proletariat, including also iterations and
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additions peculiar to early twentieth century Russia (e.g.: semi-proletariat, peasantry, petty
bourgeoisie, monarchists/aristocracy), Alinsky makes use of the modified terms: the Haves,
Have-Nots, Have-a-Little, Wants Mores, and, for different but related purposes, the
Doers/Non-Doers. While it would be unfair to insinuate that Marxists have the exclusive
right to class based terminology, in practice Alinsky’s application of these peculiar terms
does reveal his strikingly similar appreciation for political economy to Lenin’s, one that is
both practical as well as materialist in origin. Using these terms, Alinsky very succinctly
sets up the class struggle dialectic long agonized over by Marxists, “The purpose of the
Haves is to keep what they have. Therefore, the Haves want to maintain the status quo and
the Have-Nots to change it.”42 As he so plainly states, the Haves, the rough equivalent of the
bourgeoisie, are motivated to preserve the system from which they benefit materially; the
Have-Nots, the workers, take the inverse position. Alinsky uses this relatively
straightforward to illustrate a greater realist principle, what he refers to as a “duality,”
“This grasp of the duality of all phenomena is vital in our understanding of politics. It frees
one from the myth that one approach is positive and another negative. There is no such
thing in life. One man's positive is another man's negative.”43 Duality is, according to
Alinsky, not simply a rare occurrence, but part of the very nature of politics.
Once an organizer is able to grasp all-pervasiveness of dualities, they are all the
more equipped to deconstruct political language. Lenin portrays an awareness of dual
meanings within rhetoric, in an attack on the liberals within the Social Democratic party,
who were attempting to convince workers to be satisfied with limited representation in the
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new government by stuffing them “the ideas of (bourgeois) sober-mindedness, (liberal)
practicalness, (opportunist) realism, (Brentano) class struggle, (Hirsch-Duncker) trade
unions, etc.”44 As indicated by the parentheses, sober-mindedness to the bourgeoisie is not
the same as sober-mindedness to the proletariat; while one benefits from stasis and apathy,
the other is wholly on the side of action. Such value judgements are, in fact, subjective,
relative to the class interests behind them, they possess no categorical truth.
Seeing the material interests behind one’s opponents’ words relates to one of
Alinsky’s most powerful assertions, “As an organizer I start from where the world is, as it is,
not as I would like it to be. That we accept the world as it is does not in any sense weaken
our desire to change it into what we believe it should be—it is necessary to begin where
the world is if we are going to change it to what we think it should be.”45 As much as Lenin
reiterated the need to examine objective conditions, so as to be under no illusions when
acting, he never quite so elegantly articulated the drive behind realist objectivity. Alinsky
communicates that the perceived cynicism of realism must not be confused for pessimism;
refusing to look at the world romantically is not the sign of morbid nihilism, but rather of a
realist serious about creating change. This is why the grittier aspects of politics should not
be shied away from, as they do not cease to exist when gone unobserved.
This sentiment comes out in full force in his discussion of power. Alinsky clearly
despises polite society’s avoidance of the word “power” due to its unseemly connotations,
“It evokes images of cruelty, dishonesty, selfishness, arrogance, dictatorship, and abject
suffering. The word power is associated with conflict; it is unacceptable in our present
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Madison Avenue deodorized hygiene...”46 Not only does he see power as an unavoidable
reality, but as the vital essence of change, neither inherently good nor evil, “Power is an
essential life force always in operation, either changing the world or resisting change.”47
Power is both constitutive of the structure of our institutions and our relationships, while
also being the only means by which to change them. Change and power go together, Alinsky
writes, “To know power and not fear it is essential to its constructive use and control.”48
As much overlap as there is between Alinsky and Lenin, they do diverge in certain
areas. Much of this divergence can be attributed to their differing aims, contexts, and
philosophies. As opposed to Lenin, who dreamed of establishing socialism in Russia,
Alinsky had no ultimate goal other than an intentionally vague vision of a “free and open
society.” Alinsky abhorred displays of fully crystallized ideology, rejected centralization
beyond community organizations, and distrusted leaders and representatives. These
beliefs developed in part due to his experiences organizing, as well as his brief time
interning in the Chicago mob, and in part through an wide array of intellectual influences.
Alinsky read, along with the Greek classics, a range of democratic theorists from John
Dewey, to James Madison, to Alexis de Tocqueville, and even took from some Christian
theology.49 From these sources, Alinsky synthesized an unmistakably American outlook,
liberal in its commitment to individual rights, but skeptical of the democratic capacities of
representative democracy. Regardless of his education, however, it is hard to imagine that
Alinsky would have developed as revolutionary of a philosophy as Lenin’s simply due to
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their vastly different contexts; revolution in early twentieth century Russia was the only
viable path toward ending tsarism, which, suffice it to say, was not the case for Alinsky.
The first major difference between the two is the question of violence versus
compromise. Though Lenin was not a blood thirsty man, being a revolutionary by trade,
violence was part of his profession. Alinsky’s view on violence is somewhat harder to pin
down. While on one hand, he aspires toward a “free and open society,” one which might be
contradicted by the use of violent coercion, on the other, he never makes an unequivocal
disavowal of it. He openly lauds generals from the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, as well as
Lenin himself, for their tactical uses of violence, while equally praising Mahatma Gandhi for
his strategy of pacifism. According to Vijay Phulwani, violence in the abstract did not
conflict with Alinsky’s realist principles, however, for practical purposes he saw little use in
it, “His suspicion of violence came from his doubts about its value as a means for expanding
a democratic organization’s power, rather than from a moral commitment to nonviolence.”
50

Not only was he wary of the unwieldiness of violence, he was dubious of its chances of

success, considering that the state holds the greatest capacity for force. So while Alinsky
was mostly ambivalent toward violence, he was in practice a peaceful organizer. Of
compromise, on the other hand, he spoke glowingly, “to the organizer, compromise is a key
and beautiful word. It is always present in the pragmatics of operation. It is making the
deal, getting that vital breather, usually the victory.”51 Compromise, to a non-revolutionary
organizer such as Alinsky, is the embodiment of progress, as it demonstrates that the other
side was compelled to respond to one’s demands. In a world that is constantly changing,
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these small victories are sometimes all that one can hope for.
Another point which Alinsky makes a great deal out of that Lenin seems to gloss
over, is the centrality of communication to the organizer’s job. Certainly Lenin was an
effective communicator both orally and via text, possibly even a masterful one, but he only
ever indirectly alluded to communication in reference to the revolutionary cause. For
Alinsky, communication is key, as he views it as the organizer’s best means of entering into
and engaging with a community—thus opening the possibility for organization. He stresses
from the outset that communication is a “two-way process.” It is not a matter of
condescending to community members and giving orders, nor of feigning interest, but
actually sharing a meaningful exchange—something which he believed would strengthen
connections. Another principle he repeats is that, above all else, an effective communicator
must stay within the experience of their conversational partner; to step outside of their
experience is to deprive them of a point of reference, and thus diminish the impact of your
words. “Issues” must be specific, “[Issues] cannot be generalities like sin or immorality or
the good life or morals. They must be this immorality of this slum landlord with this slum
tenement where these people suffer.”52 Specificity in turn lends relevance to people’s lives,
as well as establishes a concrete point of interest; the more is communicated, the closer
they come to radicalization, “...communication occurs concretely, by means of one’s specific
experience. General theories become meaningful only when one has absorbed and
understood the specific constituents and then related them back to a general concept.”53
And so communication is the basis of any organization trying to pursue change through
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democratic means.
A complicated topic for Alinsky is morality within politics. We will explore the
democratic implications of Alinsky’s “morality of power”—his particular political
ethics—later, but for now we will focus on Alinsky’s instrumentalization of morality for
political purposes. Principally, Alinsky described himself as a moral relativist. He believed
that actors’ decisions must be judged in the context in which they were made; the more
strenuous the situation, the more ethical leighway the actor is allowed—the extreme case
being war, “in war the end justifies almost any means.”54 Like Lenin, Alinsky was against
idealist claims about the existence of a universal morality categorically true regardless of
context. To him, morality is not only contextual, but personal; it is up to individual parties
to determine what they consider to be the moral path. However, this subjectivity does not
preclude morality from being a valuable tactical tool. This is where Alinsky comes to one of
his greater innovations, what he finds to be a deficiency in Machiavelli’s realism, “Moral
rationalization is indispensable at all times of action whether to justify the selection or the
use of ends or means. Machiavelli’s blindness to the necessity for moral clothing to all acts
and motives—he said “politics has no relation to morals”—was his major weakness.”55 The
phrase “moral clothing” perfectly captures the political realist understanding of morality,
that is, not as some intrinsic quality, but rather as a political device employed for
self-interested reasons.
As has demonstrated, despite being a relatively small-scale community organizer
acting in a vastly different context, Saul Alinsky operates in much the same level as Lenin.
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Even their most glaring incongruities, for instance, their respective views of violence, are
not as much fundamental conflicts, as they are contextual ones. Alinsky is strictly
non-institutional, decentralized, anti-ideological, nonviolent, seemingly the opposite of
Lenin, yet their tactical realist approaches to politics are almost identical. From their
similarities we are able to glimpse the true general principles of political realism, while
their differences illustrate the various ways and various contexts under which it can be
employed. Particularly compelling, and a theme that will be explored later, is their shared
democratic conceptions of organizing.

Chapter 3: Wolin and the Organizers.

Returning to the present day, Wolin’s bleak description of a hammered and helpless
American people, torn apart by the various contradicting forces of late capitalism, takes on
a different tenor in the wake of Alinsky and Lenin. Though Wolin’s ideas of Superpower
and inverted totalitarianism are conceptually novel, after reading about Lenin’s struggles
orchestrating a revolution against both an entrenched monarchy and a bourgeoisie funded
by foreign capital, as well as about Alinsky’s efforts to organize poor, often minority
communities before and during the civil rights era, one cannot help but feel that the world
Wolin describes is not uniquely miserable, but rather one more example of a miserable
situation begging for political action—after all, a point our organizers have impressed over
and over again, people are most ready for change when they are most disaffected. Yet
Wolin comes to no such conclusion. In the final few chapters of Politics and Vision, he
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continues to lament the brutalization of democracy in the US, as corporations and
government steadily blend together to create a streamlined corporate-state alien to the
average person. He cries for the people, not the myth of “the people” used to legitimize
state authority, but the people whose lives have been upturned by unstable work and the
messages of fear propagated by the media. Yet, in the face of all of this discontent, Wolin
sees only one option, to retreat.
To appreciate Wolin’s conclusions, it helps to understand what exactly he sees as
Superpower’s, or postmodern power’s, most negative effects. According to him, the
development of the “advanced” economy meant that the small-scale producers, which
characterized an earlier, simpler form of capitalism, came to be replaced by enormous
corporate structures of unprecedented scale and influence:
“In postmodernity power-language is not only appropriate but necessary in the
analysis of the economic and cultural institutions and relationships that form a
system ever more comprehensive, pervading all spheres of life, and affecting the fate
of virtually every individual in the society.”56
This is what Wolin terms the “political economy,” that is, a system in which economic and
political lines have blurred to the extent that they are nearly indistinguishable from one
another. With in it, principles of efficiency and rationality rule, thus “Economy sets the
norm for all practices concerned with significant stakes of power, wealth, or status.”57
Such a specialized system, Wolin observes, can only accommodate a limited amount
of democracy, as democracy is by nature irrational, unpredictable, and dangerous to a
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status quo that favors a small elite. Representative democracy, itself already a device meant
to mitigate populism, had to be further rationalized, systematized, and bureaucratized. It
was confined to “procedural guarantees,” such as equal rights, free elections, and
regularized administration, with little room for the average person to participate.
Government became the business of specialists, consultants, and strategists, all working
together to create a “predictable, manipulable realm of politics”58 funneled to the public
through the media. The goal was to separate the public as far from the reigns of power as
possible, while engaging them enough to retain their passive consent. Wolin writes, “The
citizen is shrunk to the voter: periodically courted, warned, and confused but otherwise
kept at a distance from actual decision-making...”59 In contrast to the ideal of an active and
engaged American people, wholesomely involved in their communities’ and country’s
affairs, this new mode of operation is centralized, technocratic, and anti-political—in many
way the antithesis of democracy. As Wolin declares, “These developments represent not
simple modifications of a ‘civic culture’ but its reconstitution.”60
It should be of no surprise that Wolin, being chiefly a democratic theorist, is
horrified to witness democracy’s decline as it is replaced by voracious Superpower.
However, his reaction to this dire predicament reveals an untenable vision of the future,
which grates against the more vital proclamations of his activist days. Though he has
remained consistently anti-institution over the course of his career, preaching that
democracy can only ever occur in spite of the structures that might enable it, this sentiment
is pushed to its morbid conclusion in Politics. Wolin is not simply worried about the
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diminishing role of the demos in the affairs of government, as he is convinced that money
and power will inevitably prevail in politics, but rather goes further to question the very
notion of democracy as a form of self-rule at all. Rule, to him, implies ugly dynamics of
power in conflict with the cooperative ideals of the democratic experience, “Governing
means manning and accommodating to bureaucratize institutions that, ipso facto, are
hierarchical in structure and elitist, permanent rather than fugitive—in short,
anti-democratic.”61 He describes democracy as “fugitive” in the sense that it cannot be
captured; it is necessarily occasional and fleeting, a “moment of experience,” as opposed to
a organized process.
Given the weakness of the Many in the face of Superpower, Wolin concludes that
democracy should only ever be sought on small scales, in local institutions and
governments (e.g.: schools, public services, cultural centers), where people have the
opportunity to exercise their ingenuity to service themselves. He argues that, due to the
demanding circumstances of late capitalism, democracy must necessarily become
disjointed; being a citizen in the modern day entails for most, “doing the best one can to
take part in common tasks, the deliberations that define them, and the responsibilities that
follow.”62 These are, he admits, modest aims, but in many ways that is precisely what he
hopes to preserve: the modest, the honest, and the ordinary. Essentially, he desires to
uphold the democratic experience as it pertains to the ordinary person.
But why is Wolin so convinced that democracy must be momentary? He reveals to
us part of his motivation when he describes the “multiplicity” of forms democracy must
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take, “Multiplicity is anti-totality politics: small politics, small projects, small business,
much improvisation, and hence anathema to centralization, whether of the centralized
state or of the huge corporation.”63 Here we see that Wolin’s search for democracy is, in
actuality, a search for the opposite of totalitarianism, that is, a politics which is entirely
decentralized, non-institutional, free, and undemanding. Perhaps this is why Wolin is
unwilling to define democracy’s form—because his image of it is less of a coherent theory,
than a reaction to his greatest fears. This fear is perhaps no clearer than in his commentary
on Lenin.
Interestingly enough, Wolin appears to have a generally solid grasp of Leninist
principles. He clearly appreciates why Lenin was so fixated on organization—as he puts it,
Lenin viewed organization as an “Archimedean lever” for social change—as well as
recognizes the function of the vanguard within his framework of revolution, “organization
provided pre-conceived direction and form to the bubbling ferment of ‘spontaneous’
revolutionary forces; it maintained ‘a systematic plan of activity’ over time and preserved
‘the energy, the stability and continuity of the political struggle.”64 The image Wolin paints
of Lenin as an expert organizer is compelling, yet he promptly rejects it, accusing the
revolutionary’s methods of being elitist and anti-democratic. With undisguised contempt,
he writes:
“[Lenin] began to look upon the ‘apparatus’ with the jealous pride of the artist,
heaping scorn on those who would ‘degrade’ the organization by turning it towards
tawdry economic objectives and ‘immediate goals,’ bemoaning the ‘primitiveness’ of
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the existing organization which had ‘lowered the prestige of revolutionaries in
Russia.’ The task of the organization was to raise the workers ‘to the level of
revolutionaries,’ not to degrade the organization to the level of ‘the average
worker.’”65
Evidently, Wolin detests what he perceives to be an air of condescension emanating from
Lenin’s writing, an impression which only intensifies in his treatment of the vanguard.
According to him, the vanguard, in its role as a “core” revolutionary force, represents
nothing more than an elitist inner circle meant to exclude the masses from decision
making. It must maintain a well-regulated membership, Wolin claims, in order to preserve
the ideological unity required to protect the status quo from dissenters, in essence, from
plurality.
Besides the vanguard’s elevated status, Wolin takes issue with Lenin’s greater vision
of democracy. By his interpretation, Lenin conceived of democracy, following socialist
revolution, as occurring “within the premises of organization,” so that “the perfection of
organization would be identical with true democracy.”66 Unsurprisingly, Wolin regards this
proposal as practically oxymoronic, as, for him, not only is democracy innately
anti-institutional, but the suggestion that democracy could be achieved through
organization is absurd—this is only made worse by the fact that Lenin was such an admirer
of the power of bureaucracy.
Many of Wolin’s accusations are preemptively addressed in the earlier chapter on
Lenin. Concerning, for instance, Lenin’s patronizing tone toward “tawdry” economic
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objectives, this point would be well complemented by an understanding of how Lenin
defines the difference between “economic” struggle—workers against individual
capitalists, seeking to improve working conditions—versus “political” struggle—workers
against the government, seeking to expand people’s rights, and broaden proletarian
political power—as well as the knowledge that Lenin always supported economic struggle,
but warned of its limitations, “to forget the political struggle for the economic would
mean...to forget what the entire history of the labour movement teaches us.”67 The history
he is referring to, is the history of minor concessions used by capitalists to quell popular
uprisings.
As for the elitism of the vanguard, we are aware from our previous discussion that
the impetus for keeping a core revolutionary force is tactical, something which Wolin
appeared at first to grasp. In a battle against the monarchy and the bourgeoisie, Lenin
admits, the dissonant oppressed groups of society must be brought together, trained, and
directed, or else face defeat by more powerful, well-resourced opponents. This feat
requires a “strong organisation” able to cope with “all circumstances” at “all times,”
possessing strategic skills that are not natural or intrinsic, but rather acquired. The
eliteness of the vanguard, with this in mind, may better be ascribed to their competency
and function within the greater movement, than to snobbish privilege or arbitrary
exclusivity.
Finally, while Lenin’s democratic convictions were unusual and certainly illiberal,
they are far stronger and more prevalent than Wolin portrays them, both in terms of ethos
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and organizational structure. For instance, in the Letters from Afar, Lenin envisions the
creation of a universal proletarian militia (seemingly the evolution of the vanguard), which
would replace state apparati, “in order that they themselves should take the organs of state
power directly into their own hands, in order that they themselves should constitute these
organs of state power.”68 This people’s militia would embody their new, propertyless
society, educating people through the experience of being a truly participatory
constituency, and transforming “democracy from a beautiful signboard, which covers up
the enslavement and torment of the people by the capitalists, into a means of actually
training the masses for participation in all affairs of the state.”69 Lenin clearly abhorred
representative politics, and was consistently critical of Social-Democrats who would have
the workers “act only from without.”70 Still more revealing of Lenin’s democratic
persuasions are his moments of humility; for example, he admits that his outline for the
proletarian militia is only a rough idea, “Needless to say...when the workers and the entire
people set about it practically, on a truly mass scale, they will work it out and organize it a
hundred times better than any theoretician.”71 Clearly Lenin held democratic principles at
heart.
If one is not convinced that democracy is achievable through organization by Lenin’s
account, Alinsky, the quintessential American organizer, provides us with a potentially
more palatable, liberal argument, which even Wolin could not easily dismiss. Alinsky’s
democracy can be conceived of as somewhere in between Wolin’s and Lenin’s, for while he,
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like Wolin, was suspicious of the kind of bureaucracy that Lenin venerated, his vision of
democracy is wholly entwined with organization. This is the case for two reasons. First,
Alinsky recognized that power is the elemental language of politics, thus if any greater
aspirations for progress are to be realized, they must be reinforced by some form of
power—this is what organization provides. Second, the process of organizing power for
those who don’t have it, the Have-Nots, is, or should be, a democratic experience, where the
formerly dispossessed learn what it is like to exercise such autonomy. Phulwani writes
about Alinsky’s perspective, “Organizing is not just about building power; it is also a form
of political education for developing the democratic character and capacities of people.”72
In these ways, organization is both the provider, protector, and promoter of democracy.
Though Alinsky’s dream of a “free and open society” is certainly amenable to Wolin’s
localism, they approach the topic from different angles. This is in part due to the
peculiarities of Alinsky’s political realism, particularly with regard to his views on how
self-interest, morality, and democracy interconnect through the medium of politics.
Self-interest was, to Alinsky, not synonymous with aggressive individualism, but rather,
unconventionally, he considered it the most straightforward route to the realization that
collectivity, or the common good, is in fact to one’s greatest personal benefit—this is not
true for the Haves, of course, as they benefit from others’ exploitation. Organization, in
turn, provides those without power, who often feel demoralized and isolated, the
opportunity to witness and take part in the activities and potentials of collective action,
with luck expanding their sense of self. To this theory, Phulwani applies the notion of
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“thick” self-interest, writing about how organization functions by “broadening the sense of
self to include as many of the social relations that define an agent’s sense of self as
possible.”73 Thus organization can foster social cooperation through what is traditionally
viewed as an anti-social attitude. Once self-interested is broadened and thickened, and by
extension the collective strengthen, an organization then possesses the human power
necessary to take on larger opponents.
On the question of who will bring this into being, Alinsky, like Lenin, had no illusions
about spontaneous organization. Much in vain of the vanguard, organizers exist to agitate
communities, disorganizing the old and organizing for the new; by disrupting the
prevailing patterns of power, people are given the chance to step outside of their usual
lives, and apprehend the injustices around them from a fresh perspective. Though
Organizers provide the technical knowhow, competence, and tactical understanding
necessary to build an effective movement, they never infringe upon a community’s right to
self-determination. To violate a community in such a way, Alinsky warned, would be to
make an organizer “simply the substitution of one power group for another.”74 Organizers
place the “scaffolding,” to borrow a word from Lenin, around which the people can build
towards their own ends, in the process of which, Phulwani writes, “they would be driven by
necessity to confront, step by step, the larger structures that limited the exercise of their
newly acquired power, building their own freedom from the bottom up.”75 Empowering the
disempowered, by this account, may indeed ignite a struggle that engulfs the whole of
society.
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Now compare this confrontational stance from Alinsky with a strikingly similar, yet
far less ambitious passage from Politics, in which Wolin describes the purpose of localism:
“The aim is not to level in the name of equality or to cherish nostalgia but, by gaining
some measure of control over the conditions and decisions intimately affecting the
everyday lives of ordinary citizens, to relieve the serious and remediable distress and
to extend inclusion beyond the enjoyment of equal civil rights by making access to
educational and cultural experiences and healthy living conditions a normal
expectation.”76 [italics added]
Though the sentiment is uncontroversial, one can’t help but feel as though Wolin is
speaking from the perspective of a doctor outlining care options for a terminally ill patient.
It might be unfair to accuse Wolin of being too soft simply because he is not calling for a
revolution, however, on a strictly practical basis, i.e., from the perspective of a political
realist, his conclusions are just that. The notion that, in this time of widespread alienation
and discontent that he so vividly describes, people will suddenly realize the value of their
communal lives, and come together to nurture a vibrant, though ever-fleeing democracy
feels far fetched, particularly when considering the oppressive forces actively attempting to
dismantle anything of the sort.
Wolin cannot devise a solution to the problems he lays out, because his ultimate aim
is not progressive, in the sense that he aims to create something new, but regressive, in the
sense that he wishes to return to a way of life that will soon be extinct. By refusing to clarify
an objective, and instead defining his politics as the negation of the dominant forces in the
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world, Wolin spurns the possibility for any movement forward, and ultimately dooms his
vision to be ever in retreat from the forces it cannot confront. Jodi Dean characterizes well
Wolin’s generation of the Left, “Wary of ‘totalizing visions,’ [the Left] cede society and the
state to a capitalist class that acts as a global political class intent on extending its reach
into and strengthening its hold over our lives and futures.”77 As both Alinsky and Lenin
have demonstrated, democracy is not fated to be “fugitive,” rather this is a self-inflicted
condition brought upon by a man who would rather bask in the last remaining pockets of
his ideal, than organize for power.

Conclusion.

Though Wolin’s conclusions prove to be somewhat disappointing, this does not
diminish the value or poignancy of his observations of our modern world. If he manages to
capture anything of the modern condition, it is the feeling of bewilderment which
seemingly pervades all levels of society. How can any individual cope with the complexities
of global capitalism, which have eroded the notion of the independent nation state, and
undercut the simplicity of the public/private divide? This development is, in part, the
unavoidable side effect of globalization, but, as Wolin boldy points out, it is equally
intentional. The neoliberal economy and democracy contradict one another, and thus the
institution of the former required the drastic reduction of the latter. This was, he correctly
diagnoses, to a significant extent the motivation behind the liberal political philosophy of

77

Dean, Crowds and Party, 264.

43

the 1980s and 90s, that is, the attempt to equate democracy with rights and freedoms,
rather than participation. Even more sinister, however, is the partnership between state
and corporation, so powerful and hegemonic, that it has come to resemble the totalitarian
regimes of the past only flipped on their heads. Inverted totalitarianism, with its
unpredictable and often conflicting actions and rhetoric, has plunged the masses into
confusion, disillusionment, and an accompanying apathy, allowing the corporativist state
the room to act as it pleases without the fear of popular interference. In light of these
oppressive systems, the question remains, what is to be done?
Let us follow Alinsky’s example and consider the world as it is. Though Politics
remains a generally accurate assessment of the state of American life and politics, being
published in 2004, it has aged. It feels as though the enterprise of Superpower has, in many
ways, expanded and extended beyond Wolin’s initial conception, which has in turn
produced a noticeable psychic effect. Tellingly, Jodi Dean, writing in 2015, does not
characterize the American public as simply apathetic, but as “psychotic,” a survivalist
mentality developed in reaction to an even harsher, more competitive form of capitalism,
“The survivor is a compelling identity under conditions of extreme competition and
inequality. It validates surviving by any means necessary. Survival is its own reward.”78
Even Dean could not have predicted the crescendo of social movements which came only
months after her book was published. If anything, the madness has only increased. Among
the most intriguing are the development of the Black Lives Matter movement and the
ascendance of the Democratic Socialists of America. Both are of a generation of social
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movements attempting to approach politics in novel and creative ways, as there exists a
feeling that old forms of protest have become overly predictable, and thus manageable by
the institutions they are directed at.
The Black Lives Matter movement spawned from the social media hashtag
#BlackLivesMatter, which rose to popularity as a rallying cry against police brutality
towards African Americans around 2013. As a result of it origin, but also due to a conscious
ideological commitment, the movement is notably decentralized, and thus cannot be
characterized accurately by any one leader or organization. Various factions have produced
various lists of demands, for instance, Project Zero produced a list of demands (and
solutions) surrounding police violence, including the end of militarized policing, the
empower of prosecutors independent of the police in criminal cases, etc..79 Encouragingly
these demands are coupled with tangible policy proposals. There is, to take another
example, Black Youth Project 100 based in Chicago, which focuses on the recruitment of
18-35 year old activists,80 and the Black Lives Matter website itself has 24 chapter from
around the country listed.81
As it is hard to get a grasp what/who actually constitutes the Black Lives Matter
movement, it is nearly impossible to gauge its “effectiveness.” There is certainly a lot to be
critiqued within the movement, for instance, is over reliance on “demands” as a form of
negotiation—Alinsky would have contended that demands mean nothing if not backed up
by power. In fairness, BLM does have a wide reach, and has managed to achieve a longevity
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rarely seen among social media causes. As Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor bluntly put it, “The
movement is confronted with many challenges, but it has also shown that it will not go
away easily. This has less to do with the organizing genius of organizers than with deep
anger among ordinary Blacks...”82 However, it cannot be denied that BLM has changed and
enlivened the discourse on race in America; even, as Alinsky would have approved of,
created conflict—the only real path to change.
At the same time as #BLM was taking off, the DSA was in the process of revitalizing
itself around the beginning of the Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaign, which began in
2014.83 As part of this reorganization, in 2018, the DSA initiated a new electoral strategy,
which intends to run true DSA candidates around the US in both local, state, and national
elections, rather than simply endorsing left leaning, but otherwise independent politicians.
84

Importantly, also, on higher stakes tickets, candidates will run as democrats, in order to

avoid the inherent disadvantages of being from a third party. The intention behind this
electoral strategy is to give the DSA more control over the candidates they endorse, so as to
avoid divergence from the party line. It is an intriguing strategy, and so far has shown
success.
In light of the principles of political realism we have gathered, both the DSA and
BLM show their own strengths. BLM is truly a social media movement; it has managed to
communicate successful on a mass scale with a simple but effective message, “Black Lives
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Matter.” To not take notice of their success would be a mistake; as Lenin wrote, “There is
nothing more dangerous in a revolutionary period than belittling the importance of tactical
slogans that are sound in principle.”85 The DSA, on the other hand, is consolidating power in
a much more direct, almost traditional way, attacking the establishment via its own
institutions. No doubt Jodi Dean would approve, as she both advocates for the construction
of a communist party, and acknowledges the necessity that the left to confront state power,
“At some point, however, an encounter with the state or the economy becomes unavoidable
as one or the other becomes a barrier to movement ideals.”86
The future of these movements remains to be seen, however, their examples bode
well for their successors. Both show a political savviness, and a willingness to take politics
seriously that have not been popular among the left for many decades. Hopefully this
propensity to organization, and potentially political realist undertones, will lead to a truly
powerful left in the future, capable of taking on the force of Superpower on its own terms.
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